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 3 
Abstract 
 
 A cultural aspect of westernization remains in the shadow of widely discussed 
economic and political ones. While many states are conforming to the Western rules of 
the global market game, the cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and 
thus less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones.  
 The dissolution of the U.S.S.R. has left behind a void in the Russian identity.  
After unsuccessful attempts to assume a Western liberal identity during the first half of 
the 90s, Russia has opted for tried and tested Orthodox Christianity to fill that void and to 
form a new post-Soviet Russian identity.  In the uncertain socio-economic conditions of 
post-Soviet Russia, many Russians looked to the Orthodox Church for guidance. The 
Church was frequently invoked in discussions on national identity and in deliberations 
over the country’s future.  
 The separation of the state and the church of the Western Europe has become one 
of the democratic staples of domestic and international policies. The westernization of  
traditional societies (e.g. India, Russia) introduces liberal principles along with a 
complete secularization of the society and political life.  This incites an opposing reaction 
of the Church and state coming together in Russia to secure Russian national identity.  
 To re-affirm and secure its national identity Russia began pushing itself away 
from Western secular identity. The criminalization of blasphemy in 2013 has become a 
step to secure and to re-affirm Russian national identity. 
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Introduction 
 
1. The Russian Federation is a secular state. No religion may be instituted as state-
sponsored or mandatory. 2. Religious associations are separated from the State, and are 
equal before the law. 
Article 14 of Constitution of Russian Federation (1993) (1) 
 
There is no alternative to Christian Orthodoxy right now. No political party is capable to 
maintain order in the country on its own: ROC's and state interaction is necessary if we 
want Russia to be strong.  
Father Sergii, Father Superior of the Moscow Cathedral of Descent of the Holy Spirit 
(Рыбко, 2012) (2)   
 
 
 The global trend of de-secularization could be a reaction to the forces of 
Westernization spreading liberal culture and ideas, secularism among them. In recent 
years Russia has been undergoing de-secularization, with the merger between the state 
and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the criminalization of blasphemy as a 
result. I maintain that two factors have promoted and continue to promote the 
amalgamation of church and state in Russia: the specific structure of Russian national 
identity with Orthodox Christianity and "the otherness" as its essential parts and also the 
threat to a secure national identity created by the forces of Westernization.  
 In the past 30 years the world has been experiencing a dramatic religious 
resurgence with various degrees of fundamentalism. Contrary to the predictions of many 
philosophers and sociologists, from Karl Marx to Peter Berger, modernization did not 
eliminate "the opium of masses".  
 What it is behind the rise of religiosity in the age of science and information? In 
some cases the religious revival so aptly dubbed "the revenge of God" (3) literally 
appears to be a revenge to "infidels".  In others it is an attempt to restore a pre-communist 
identity.  In the case of Europe, the cause is purely demographic: the growing influx of 
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refugees from Middle East.  By contrast, my research focuses on globalization, 
specifically Westernization, as a principal cause for religious revival. Globalization has 
resulted in increasing inequality, disruption to local communities, and a shift in the focus 
from traditional values to materialism (4). Since globalization has influenced every aspect 
of modern societies, I maintain that it is in part responsible for the religious revival within 
many states. As Robertson & Chirico (5) noted, "the virtually worldwide eruption of 
religious and quasi-religious concerns and themes cannot be exhaustively comprehended 
in terms of focusing on what has been happening sociologically within societies."  
 After Francis Fukuyama's declaration of the “end of history” in 1992 (6), Western 
liberal political thought seemed to have taken a prescient turn. The Berlin Wall fell, 
followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Empire and the Warsaw Pact. In fact, Fukuyama 
had merely articulated a deep-rooted conviction of the West in the universality of its 
cultural and economic model. Liberal ideas had swiftly swept away what for 70 years 
was perceived as an indestructible barrier for various freedoms and human rights. The 
euphoria, however, did not last long. The contradictions between the proverbial "East" 
and "West," which had shaped the world for centuries, re-surfaced as quickly as the 
mighty Soviet bloc collapsed. The most prominent realization of this came from Samuel 
Huntington in his Foreign Affairs article (and later a book based on it) on the "Clash of 
Civilizations" (7). Huntington drew a thick line through the European map between the 
areas characterized by Western Christianity and those influenced by the Eastern Christian 
heritage. Not only did he envision the return of the centuries old confrontation between 
Western and Orthodox Christianity, he noted that that Orthodox Christian societies 
seemed “much less likely to develop stable democratic political systems.”  Huntington's 
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article was published in 1993, when enthusiasm for democratic reforms in Russia was 
still high. His idea was met with harsh criticism. However, it pointed to an emerging 
trend that had not received attention amidst the “end of history” triumphalism. That drift 
was in Huntington's shift toward research focused on culture and ethnology and away 
from the ideologically oriented theories of Fukuyama. Just like his Russian colleagues 
Vernadsky, Gumilev, Berdyaev and many others, Huntington takes religious teachings as 
the last frontier that divides the civilizations and an insurmountable barrier to a global 
consensus on governing human affairs. Civilization, for Huntington, is "cultural affinity": 
language, history, customs and religion. Huntington preempts possible criticism of such 
broad generalizations by insisting that every individual ultimately identifies with a 
particular civilization.  
 In my thesis I intend to answer two broad questions. First, how does globalization 
affect national identities? Second, why is resisting globalization inevitable in civilizations 
with a cultural code different from a cultural code of the source of globalization?  In 
addressing these questions I will consider the emerging Russian religious nationalism, 
focusing on the significance of anti-blasphemy law. I maintain that this particular change 
to the Russian Criminal Code, imperfect from the start, with the vague terminology of 
"insulting religious feelings", is the most extreme expression of the current merger 
between the Russian state and the ROC. While it is almost impossible to determine the 
exact meaning of "religious feelings" for judicial purposes, the law is being abused (by 
the ROC mostly) in order to declare religion's significance for the national identity and to 
show the Russian state’s willingness to re-define itself as "traditional" and different from 
the increasingly secular Western culture. 
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Why have these questions arisen with such force today? Compared to the 
economic, political, and cultural impact of globalization, its influence on religion and 
culture has received insufficient attention. The interaction between religion and 
globalization yields various outcomes. Under the influence of the multiple forces of 
globalization, each religion offers its own particular way of either more or less peaceful 
co-existence. At the core of Westernization is a liberal model which suggests a universal 
one-size-fits-all system of values with the "individual" at the base of it. This contradicts a 
staple dogma of many old religious teachings: the priority of communal interest. 
Globalization has "a disembedding effect" (8, 9). It has "move(d) from a concrete, 
tangible, local context to an abstract or virtual state."   Thus the concept of humans 
belonging to, and anchored by, a local tradition is replaced by a global one. A struggle 
between universal identity and local ones leads to revival of reactionary religion, 
fundamentalism, and even religiously driven terrorism around the globe.  
 Why are these questions important? Vyacheslav Karpov (10) rightfully points out 
that the proliferation of theories on the spread of secularization makes for a sharp contrast 
with the scant amount of research on resistance to secularization. The main reason for 
this is the relatively recent emergence of resistance. 
 The goal of my thesis is to demonstrate that the source of globalizing forces, the 
Western world, is perceived in Russia as predominantly secular and therefore alien to 
Russia’s historically-rooted conceptions of community and individual identity, which 
rests on the individual’s being embedded in a social and religious context that is 
particularistic, not universal. Partly as a result of the dichotomy between Russia and the 
West, the Russian state has fallen further back on Orthodox Christianity to cement 
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national identity. This is an example of what Catherine Kinvall calls "to securitize 
subjectivity", or in other words, to re-affirm a threatened self-identity (11). The voluntary 
or unintended imposition of universal values of one culture leads to an opposing reaction. 
This can take the form of asserting religious, cultural and traditionalist values that are 
specific to the society or the civilization it springs from. Religion and "ethnocentrism" 
(12) act as powerful responses to the insecurity and disruptions created by globalizing 
forces emanating from the West. 
 Methodology: To determine religion-based resistance to the westernization in the 
Russian context, I use the example of Russia's criminalization of blasphemy in Article 
148 of the Criminal Code of Russian Federation in 2012. With its adoption Russia has 
joined approximately a quarter of the world's states that outlaw blasphemy, which 
includes India, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. That law was enacted shortly after the 
infamous "Pussy Riot" case, when three members of the feminist protest group staged a 
performance in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow.  The three members were 
convicted of "hooliganism motivated by religious hatred", and each was sentenced to two 
years' imprisonment. The criminalization of religious insults in Russia is a mirror image 
of the reverse processes in Western European countries: England and Scotland (in 2008), 
Netherlands (in 2012), Norway (in 2015) and Iceland (in 2015) in turn have gone in the 
opposite direction of repealing of blasphemy laws thus "securitizing their subjectivity" 
with the growing influx of the migrants from the Middle East.  
 I address my research questions using descriptive and interpretive methods. 
Admittedly it would be hard to pinpoint the precise moment when the acceleration of 
church and state integration in Russia began. Nevertheless, I contend that a useful starting 
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point is when blasphemy was criminalized by an officially secular state. This represented 
a milestone on the path to what became a sustained campaign of resistance to secular 
westernization. 
 I address the research questions in the following sequence. In Chapter I, I briefly 
explain what aspect of globalization has had the most effect in Russia.  In Chapter II, I 
review post- and pre-Soviet Russian identity, especially the role of religion. In the 
Chapter III, I explore the criminalization of blasphemy as not just a legislative act that 
"securitizes subjectivity", but as a cultural counterattack against globalization, especially 
its secular element. (Kinvall, 2006).)  
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Chapter 1. Globalization  
 
 A volume of scientific and popular literature on globalization can be 
overwhelming. For the purposes of this thesis, I use a particular definition of  
"globalization."  The many works on the globalization, by such scholars as Ulrich Beck 
and Anthony Giddens agree that it is complex and non-linear. The essential, basic 
features of globalization are the  "world's compression and a rapid increase in 
consciousness of the whole world." (1) Globalization has been underway throughout, but 
in the 20th century "it has involved some real changes in terms of scale, speed and 
cognition... - there is an increased perception of the 
globe as a smaller place – that events elsewhere have consequences for our everyday 
political, social and economic lives affecting individuals." (2) 
 Globalizational process is commonly described as communicational, political, 
economic, environmental or cultural.  First, I consider it necessary to define that in my 
research I deal with a last aspect of globalizational process only - a cultural/religious one. 
Too often the cultural aspect of globalization takes a backseat to economic and political 
ones, reducing it to a  rather a side effect of the more important economic aspects. 
Marxist thought exemplifies this tendency by referring to the economy being as the 
"base" to social processes, customs, laws and beliefs as “superstructure.” This paradigm 
continues to shape the minds of many scholars who see globalization quite one-sidedly, 
as a largely economic and technological phenomenon. However, as the so- called 
"cartoon crisis" of 2005 in Denmark and the "Charlie Hebdo” shootings of 2015 in Paris 
have made clear, "religion and culture are active forces in their own right." (3) 
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 Second, I realize that globalization is not one sided, meaning it has different 
spatial directions: from West to East and opposite. Migrations from the east and the, and 
south to the West changed the latter’s demography and, as a consequence. its traditional 
cultural practices. Still, there is a consensus that the Western culture drives and shapes 
globalization more than any other culture. William Stahl, for instance, calls globalization 
"the most recent stage of modernization, in which the processes that have transformed 
western civilization over the past 400 years have spread to the entire planet." (4) Thus in 
my thesis globalization is viewed as the dissemination of Western culture in its many 
aspects.  
 For the scholars who view globalization as westernization, or even 
Americanization, it is customary to quote a speech Harry Truman gave at Baylor 
University in Texas on March 6, 1947 (5,6): "The whole world should adopt the 
American system. The American system can survive in America only if it becomes a 
world system." Indeed globalization is not only westernization, but just as Stephen Walt’s 
theory on balance of threats stresses in explaining alliance formation, the key is how 
globalization is perceived in cultures-recipients: China, India, and, in the case of this 
thesis, Russia. In these countries, Western expansion is treated as economic, political and 
cultural imperialism that causes fundamental confrontations around the world. In the 
view of many contemporary Russian scholars such as Gadjiev, Dugin, and Leksin—and 
regardless of whether they are conservatives or liberals —globalization is perceived as an 
attempt of predominantly American political and intellectual elites to turn a "rather 
limited complex of liberal ideas and principles" (7), that is closely tied to human rights, 
democracy, and the market economy and presents itself as a  universal, one-size-fits-all 
 12 
model. Due to the imposition of that model on other cultures, the dichotomous  ultimatum 
- "you are either with us or against us" - is being invoked in Western political, economic, 
military, and cultural discourse. In this Manichean thinking the Western standard agenda 
of liberalism is pitted against "the rest of the world." Thus this discourse posits an "East," 
even though neither West nor East is homogenous.  
 Consider a following quote from Sergei Filatov, a prominent researcher of 
religion well known for his critique of the ROC's current policies since the time he was a 
head of President Yeltsin's administration: "With some generalization that papers over 
complexity  and the contradictory elements of reality, one could state that globalization is 
indeed Americanization.  The American system of values is more universal, - our 
patriots, mainly Christian Orthodox critics of globalization claim that it brings along 
secularization and materialism; it destroys religiosity." (8)  
 Professor Nikolai Pokrovski echoes these statements:  "Russia's weak social 
structure gives way to the worst and most extreme tendencies in globalization. 
Globalization takes the form of Americanization in Russia…Americanization is a 
globalization." (9) 
 An opposition to the dispersion of American values has yet another explanation. 
During the final years of the U.S.S.R., and up to the mid-1990s when Russia was going 
through a profound transformation of its planned economy into one based on market one 
a complete changeover of a Soviet national identity, Russia has gone through what is now 
commonly recognized as the hardest times since the end of the Great Patriotic War in 
1945. According to the polls of Levada Center, a leading organization of sociological 
research in Russia, in 2014 59% of Russian population evaluated the reforms of the 
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1990s negatively. (10) Therefore, the globalization, which commenced in the USSR 
much later most other places and therefore swept in at a higher speed, is irrevocably 
connected to the times of what, in many Russians’ eyes, could be called Emile Durkheim 
called  “anomie."  By that he meant "a total dispersion of system of values in politics, 
economy and culture." (11) 
 The expansion of American values consequently eliminates space for national 
cultures and threatens to erase their uniqueness. Reflect on the following data for 2014 
from European Audiovisual Observatory: Up to 80% of the films in Russian cinema are 
produced in the U.S., 10% are a combined share of "the rest of the world", leaving for the 
Russian cinema market meager 10%. (12)  In the minds of sociologists the sad state of 
affairs of the Russian film industry resembles defeat in a war. Although it is an  
informational one, the stakes re even higher for Russia than NATO’s expansion to 
Russia’s western and southern borders. "In reality, Hollywood's output is not an 
entertainment but rather a weapon of a mass destruction of human consciousness masked 
as an amusing product. This product leads to a paralysis of intellect, mind, societal 
spiritual values; it is therefore more efficient than any actual military assault. Hollywood 
deforms the psychological condition of the vast human masses and promotes constant 
social degeneration." (13) That statement comes from the president of the Russian 
Sociological Association, Vladimir Dobrenkov; but he merely articulates an opinion held 
by many sociologists and political scientists in Russia.   
 There are two general theories on globalization's impact on cultures. The 
homogenization thesis views globalization as Americanization/westernization and claims 
that it destroys local identities as part of an effort to spread  a universal, liberal culture 
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around the world (Beck (14), Ritzer (15), Jan Nederveen Pieterse (16), Bauman (17)). By 
contrast, those who see the emergence of a complex global culture comprised of diverse 
elements from different parts of the world adhere to "hybridization thesis" ((Tomlinson 
(18), Hannerz (19), Appadurai, (20)). And finally scholars like Huntington, Barber, 
Berger (21), Holton (22), Gadjiev (23) stick to "polarization thesis". They claim that 
dispersion of global values that are rooted in American liberal values creates anti-
globalization movements of a far more radical character than those that we can observe 
when there are G7 summits. In my research I shall demonstrate how the case of Russia 
could be viewed as an instance of "polarization thesis" of Huntington's theory, for whom 
interdependence on a global scale does not involve cultural conformity. I contend that 
desecularization tendencies in Russia in the last 20 plus years, what Vyacheslav Karpov 
calls "a counter-secularization," (24) amounts to a protest against the "godless" 
secularizing West. Since the focus of religion is the spiritual quest and eternal question of 
the meaning of life, it will inevitably resist projects that  reduce human affairs to the 
pursuit of, and competition over, material success. Religion is being challenged by a 
globalization that diffuses the western values around the world—and religion, at least in 
Russia, resists.   
 Globalization has arrived in Russia relatively late: at the end of the 1980s. At that 
time USSR was essentially atheistic society. But Western influence (especially the ideas 
of democracy, political freedom, human rights) has contributed to a religious renaissance. 
Paradoxically, globalization instigated a process that was a completely different to what 
was happening in the de-secularized West. 
 As Patriarch of Moscow and of all Rus' (Russia) Kirill duly noted that during 
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Soviet era signing of many of international agreements (apparently Helsinki accords is 
implied first and foremost) was a hypocrisy: while adhering to world standards of human 
rights on paper, they never followed on their agreements through (25). Kirill has 
rightfully identified the causes of this hypocrisy: it was Soviet government's attempt to 
refute West's accusations in totalitarianism and a desire to accuse West of similar 
wrongdoings. However, in Kirill's critique towards Soviet officials, their hypocrisy was 
not the main point, but rather it is the very fact of signage to those agreements, that since 
then has turned into a inseparable part of internal laws of OCSE countries. Striving to fix 
that "misstep" of Soviet foreign policy, authors of "Bases of ROC's Social Concept" (26) 
has included a following provision at the very end of the document: "ROC cannot 
perceive positively a common worldview in which a sinful human individuality is 
placed in the center of everything" Further on ROC declares its intention "to strive for 
acceptance of legitimacy of a religious worldview as the base for socially significant 
activities (including those of the state) and for making the religious perspective an 
essential factor of international law and international organization's policies" 
(Bases, 2000, bold in original). 
 "Bases" reflects the anti-democratic stand of the majority of ROC's clergy and its 
aversion to political freedoms and human rights.  This resistance to democratic 
development in Russia, and hence to globalization in the eyes of many Russian scholars 
(Filatov, Malashenko, Dugin, Sitnikov and others), is deeply rooted in the history of 
Russia and the national identity of its people. In the next chapter I shall investigate what 
religion means for the Russian national identity and why it could it be a cause for 
opposition to westernization and to the criminalization of blasphemy as a result. 
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Chapter 2.  Russian National Identity 
 
"It is necessary to educate all Russians that personal identity is secondary and 
consequential of national identity. Russians have to realize that firstly they are Christian 
Orthodox, secondly they are Russians, and thirdly humans." 
Alexander Dugin, Bases of Geopolitics (1) 
 In this chapter I will establish how the structure of national identity in Russia is 
producing a resistance to the West’s cultural influence. The first part of the chapter's 
focus is on Orthodox Christianity as an essential element of Russian national identity. 
The second part discusses the "negative construction" of national identity in Russia and 
how it is built on the idea of "the otherness". 
 Since fewer Christians practice daily than are non-practicing in Russia, how could 
religious identity be so vital for Russia in Huntington's theory? The answer is that the 
U.S.S.R. for more than 70 years was an atheistic land with many churches functioning as 
storage spaces for vegetables or serving as antireligious museums. (Examples of this 
include the Church of the Savior on Spilled Blood and Saint Isaac's Cathedral in Saint 
Petersburg.) 
 One could rightfully suppose that the importance of the religious element in 
national identity would differ culture to culture. Compare, for instance, states with a long 
story of secularism and a liberal tradition, such as the Netherlands, to ones in the far less 
democratic and self-avowedly more traditional Christian Orthodox countries.  The 
evidence shows that the percentage of respondents that consider religion as very 
important for national identity ranges from 3% Netherlands to 46 % in Bulgaria (2). 
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 So why, regardless of the actual numbers of the Orthodox faith practitioners in 
Russia, is religion an essential element of the Russian national identity? The answer is 
can be found in the history of the relationship between the state and the ROC.   
 The Prince Vladimir's historical choice of the Byzantine Christianity  in 988 AD 
was made when the Eastern Roman Empire, with its capital in Constantinople, was 
flourishing and the Western Roman Empire was in decline.  In 1054 AD, shortly after 
Russia's baptism, the Pope and the Patriarch of Constantinople excommunicated each 
other. The schism between Western and Eastern Orthodoxy still remains. For seven 
centuries the ROC enjoyed relative independence. However, ever since Russia opted for 
Byzantine Christianity, a Tsar (Caesar) has dominated both the secular and religious 
realms.  
 Peter I’s reforms of the Church in the early 18th century made the ROC just one 
of several departments of a new bureaucratic state. In 1764 Catherine the Great 
concluded Peter's reforms by de-privatization of the ROC's lands. That decision 
eliminated any remnant of the church's independence and power.  From that moment on 
the ROC’s role came to be the preaching of official state ideology and the glorification of 
the Romanov's dynasty. Attacks on the Church were judged not by a Church court but by 
a civil court because the clergy were regarded as state employees (3). According to John 
Madeley, the "tradition of the Eastern churches” submission to the will of the sovereign, 
or ceasaro-papism, corresponded to the development within Orthodoxy of a spiritual 
tradition that turned more towards union with God than to sustaining society. That, in 
turn, encouraged the passive acceptance of fate and/or providence" (4). 
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 Cut off from administrative and economic resources, the ROC has wielded a 
different kind of power, one that Joseph Nye has dubbed "soft power." For Russia had 
"no classical antiquity to provide alternative models of cultural identity: no ancient ruins 
littering the landscape; no classical education bringing direct access to ancient Greek and 
Latin literature or philosophy" (5). This circumstance signified a principal difference 
between European and Russian culture. While the former was based in universities, the 
latter's cultural centers were situated in monasteries (6). Thus the Church has become a 
facilitator of Russian identity and the cultural agency of the state (7) -- until 1917 when a 
new sort of state emerged in Russia. 
 In 1834, in his report to Nicholas I, the Minister of Education, Count Sergey 
Uvarov revealed the now famous triad of 'Orthodoxy - Autocracy - Peoplehood.' 
According to Uvarov's theory, Russian people are deeply religious and loyal to the Tsar, 
Orthodox faith, and Tsarist autocracy, which created the essential conditions for Russia's 
existence. The state-church concept of 'Peoplehood' ('Narodnost') was interpreted as a 
necessity, as a means to preserve Russia's own traditions and to reject foreign influences, 
all in order to oppose Western ideas, such as freedom of thought, individualism and 
rationalism. As Sergei Filatov noted, "the necessary unity of all of the three elements 
provided a symbol of Russian statehood until 1917" (8).  
 The Uvarov's model has proved to be so enduring that even after almost 70 years 
of systematic repressions by the state, the church is not able to perceive itself separately 
from the state, let alone to emerge as a force that opposes state policies. The Byzantine 
formula of "church-state symphony" with the Tsar being a head of both church and state 
is still an ideal one for ROC. In return, the Church in Russia expects protection and 
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financing, and the state readily obliges. As the Professor of Saint Petersburg Theological 
Academy Georgi Mitrofanov argues, "Strictly speaking without the Church there would 
be no Russia, neither good nor bad Russia - just none" (9). It is worth noting that Russia’s 
Byzantine legacy is also revealed in the tradition of viewing the Tsar as "an anointed 
one". On that account, citizen's rights are limited to whatever is being granted by the 
supreme power.  
 Russia's position on the map in between European and Asian parts of the 
continent also plays an important role in its national identity structure. The cultural 
linkages between Russia and Europe are undeniable, but "geopolitics, climate and 
geography pull [Russia] closer to the East" (10). Due to its Asian influences, Russia 
gravitates towards "collective identity" rather than the individual one of the West. 
According to Berdyaev the highly differentiated society of the East Russian Orthodoxy is 
characterized by "'sobornost', a symphonic unity among individual, family, and society, 
in which all elements contributed to the development of each other" (11). Additionally, 
according to Orthodox eschatological philosophy, our world keeps distancing itself 
further away from God and love, and drifting towards an accumulation of evil and sins. 
That kind of society is "in a dire need of healing" (12). That is why interaction with the 
world is understood in Christian Orthodoxy as work, public service that is realized 
through God given talents.  
 The shift away from the state atheism of the USSR and the first steps towards 
Russia’s new model of interaction between state and religious organizations is rightfully 
attributed to Gorbachev and the Communist Party’s then chief ideologist, Alexander 
Yakovlev. The turning point was April 1988, a month and a half before official 
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celebrations of the Millennial Anniversary of Russia's Christianization Patriarch of 
Mosco. ROC's Synod members were invited to the Kremlin for a historic statement by 
Gorbachev, who announced that "believers are in fact Soviet people, working people, 
patriots and they are fully entitled to express their faith in dignity...We have a lot of 
things in common for a fruitful dialogue between us, as we have common history, 
common Fatherland, and common future" (13). Two years after that statement there was 
a newly adopted Russian law, "On the Freedom of Conscience," (14) which declared 
"every citizen's right to freely choose, practice and spread any religion or to not to belong 
to any confession" (article 3). According to the law, "none of the faiths or religious 
organizations could be advantaged or disadvantaged against the other."  The state was 
declared "neutral in confessional freedoms, meaning it does not take the side of any 
religion or ideology" (Article 10). According to that law, registration of any religious 
organization was complete with a simple request to the local executive branch. Unlike 
before, no governmental consent was necessary. This clause has enabled an influx of 
various foreign religious and quasi-religious entities into Russia. Vyacheslav Polosin, the 
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Religious Freedom, claimed in a 1993 
Pravda article that "some 200,000 preachers from the United States had invaded Russia 
to form new religious societies." Unfortunately, many of those new societies were 
deemed sects or religious cults in their states of origin. Aum Shinrikyo, which organized 
the sarin gas attack in Tokyo subway in 1995, being one of them. After a few years, this 
new wave of foreign religious influence began to be viewed by the state and the ROC as 
alien to Russian culture and national identity, and accordingly as extremely dangerous. 
For instance, a former deputy Chairman of the Russian government's Council on 
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Religious Affairs, G.A. Mikhailov, wrote in 1997, "Mass religious shows that gather 
thousands of Russian citizens are so out of the context of Russian realities... [T]hey aim 
to disrupt and destroy local traditional values." (15) Already in 1997, Mikhailov had 
noted the importance of avoiding the temptation to repress sectarian movements without 
a proper basis in the law as it leads to "sectophobic" tendencies amongst nationalist and 
conservative organizations in Russia.   
 For the last 25 years religiosity in Russia has gone up but not as drastically is it 
thought to have. According to the polls on religiosity that reveal numbers of participation 
in liturgy, every day praying, faith in the main Christian dogma, resurrection of Christ, 
afterlife and so on - Russia is one of the most non-religious countries in the world. In the 
words of Professors Furman and Kaariaynen: The ROC is a "colossus with the feet of 
clay". According to the polls of their research in 2002, 80% of Russians consider 
themselves Christian Orthodox, 52% stated that have a very positive outlook on 
Orthodox Christianity, and only 1% had viewed Orthodox Christianity in negative light. 
Yet these are impressive numbers to back up a religious resurgence in a country that just 
10 years prior to that research was officially atheistic. However according to the same 
poll only 7% of the poll participants attend church at least once per month.  Nineteen 
percent of the respondents went to church a few times a year, 31% did once per year, and 
42% did not attend church at all. According to the Ministry of Interior Affairs only 3 
million Russians have attended Christmas liturgy on the January 8 2004 - that is less than 
2% of population of a supposedly Christian Orthodox state. Moreover, in Moscow less 
than 1% of the city's 10.5 million people have attended church on Christmas. Compare 
these numbers to those of Russia's neighbors, for example Poland, where 96% of the 
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population actively exercise their faith through daily prayers, regular church attendance, 
and participation in rituals. (16) 
 Considering the low numbers of the people actually practicing Orthodox 
Christianity I contend that the Christian Orthodox identity of Russians bears features of 
cultural identity. "I am Orthodox" appears to be broader than the religious identity "I am 
Orthodox Christian". That according to Patriarch Alexii explains away the discrepancy 
between staggering numbers of people that consider themselves Christian Orthodox in 
Russia and people that actually practice Christianity actively: "One considers himself 
Orthodox not because of belief in God but rather because of baptizing, because of living 
in a country with Orthodox traditions." (17) Words of the Patriarch find confirmation in 
sociological research: the Christian Orthodoxy represents "a substitute or a functional 
replacement of ethnicity, as a phenomenon of reduction of complex identity structures to 
more simple and archaic ones" - states Natalia Zorkaya. She bases her conclusion on 
Levada Center polls according to which 69% of respondents perceive themselves as 
"Christian Orthodox." (18)   The polls conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research 
Center (ВЦИОМ) yield almost coinciding results: 75% of respondents think of 
themselves as Christian Orthodox, citing "the desire to be a part of the national tradition" 
as the main motive for doing so. (19)  
 Robert Kunovich comes to a similar conclusion with his 2006 exploration of 
salience of religion for the national identity in European countries. He states that 
"religion may provide a basis for national identity because religion is an identity that can 
overlap with national identity, reinforces other objective and subjective characteristics 
that provide a basis for national identity, and facilitates group mobilization."(20) This 
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close to total acceptance of Orthodox Christianity as an element of national identity 
paradoxically co-exists with the low numbers of the people that actually practice 
Orthodox Christianity.  The sociologists argue that Christian Orthodox confession spread 
their influence on non-believers as well: religious self-identification is founded not on 
actual practice of faith but rather on the base of regarding oneself with the certain culture 
and national tradition. (21) 
 The second element of Russian identity that contributes to the country’s resistance 
to external influences also has its roots in the historical choice of Russia to inherit 
Byzantine Christianity. Along with keeping the nation secure military, economically or 
politically there is an 'identity securitizing' (22, 23) where the state acquires the notion of 
its own culture through setting itself in opposition to a radically different and threatening 
'other'. Religion plays an important part in articulating the national identity and situating 
a certain state as a part of 'in-group' or 'out-group'. " Those who are different from us, 'the 
other', are often stereotyped and perceived as more dangerous and threatening than those 
who are more similar." (21) 
 The famed historian of Russian culture Yuri Lotman maintained that "polarity, or 
duality of structure is the principal feature of Russian culture." (25) That would suggest a 
never-ending standoff between Orthodox Christianity and paganism, and then Orthodox 
Christianity and Catholicism.  And now, in our time, there is a standoff between Russia 
and the West. For the Russian state, the Church the West has long been perceived as a 
source of constant threat. It has been seen as a traditional foe and potential colonizer of 
Russia. It has been feared as a source of moral corruption and westernization. And it has 
been suspected of seeking to turn Russia into “a raw material appendage”. According to 
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the 1996 polls of the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (ВЦИОМ), 59% of 
respondents thought that the West was always attempting to colonize Russia and 55% 
were convinced of the West’s intention to impoverish Russia and lead it to complete 
disintegration. (26) 
 Focusing on the West as a main component of national identification was always 
full of inherent ambiguity and contradiction. While being an ideal model for material 
welfare, prosperity, technological progress, the West at the same time was also perceived 
as a threat to Russia's "initial self" ('samost') and the source of inevitable destruction of 
Russia's traditional isolationism. Spreading of Western 'other’ or 'modern' ideas meant 
not only "the danger for patriarchal social order's decline, but was also cursed as dreadful 
invasion of the foreign spirit of merciless mercantilism, rational positivism and lifeless 
formalism of law." (27) 
 The "otherness" of Russian national identity also finds its expression in 
Eurasianism with its distinctiveness from the West and Berdyaev's Russian Idea. The 
Russian Idea is comprised of the three main elements: the ROC, the peasant commune, 
and a powerful state. The Russian Idea presupposes "the prevalence of statehood 
('gosudarstvennost'), spirituality ('duhovnost') and strong patriotism." It also provides an 
intellectual foundation for the rejection of the West’s culture, political systems and 
models of modernization. For advocates of the Russian Idea, Russia can only be saved by 
following its own unique historical path and, by extension, rejecting the globalizing 
forces that will distort Russia's development." (28) 
 Public statements of ROC's officials, including Patriarch Kirill, Archbishop 
Hilarion, Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, reveal their unending suspicion of the West with 
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its "aggressive liberalism and secularism" and "principal aim to expel religion, in general, 
and the Orthodox Church, in particular from society and to diminish the influence of 
religion on people's behavior and life." (29) 
 The salience of Orthodox Christianity for the Russian identity is so undisputed 
these days that it makes possible processes that would seem absurd just a quarter of a 
century ago. For instance, the ROC and the Communist party have found common 
ground. Aside from the current warm relations of the leader of Russian communists 
Gennady Zyuganov and Patriarch Kirill, there is also the old narrative that "Jesus was the 
first communist."  The Communist Party’s official site contains 295 articles mentioning 
Jesus Christ, including "Jesus was with the reds not the bourgeoisie" among them (30). 
When the Orthodox Passover celebration has fallen on the main Communist holiday of 
the May 1, Patriarch Kirill addressed his congregation saying that "to cancel the 
traditional World Proletariat Day demonstration because of Passover would be 
inconsiderate because it is such an important holiday for many people." (31)  
 My brief analysis reveals that both religion and the sense of 'the otherness' are 
essential elements of the Russian national identity. In the next chapter I will exemplify 
how both of these elements create Russia's resistance to the Western cultural influence.  
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Chapter 3. 
Russia Opposing the West: The Criminalization of Blasphemy 
 
Much to the surprise of scholars who predicted modernization’s impending 
eradication of religion, the world's development appears to be a non-linear process. For 
instance, Auguste Comte argued that religion's place would be taken by science as a 
result of the pragmatism prevalent in the modern society. Weber, in turn, augured the 
"world's disenchantment" (1). While both of Comte and Weber did not live to see a 
paradigm shift towards secularization, Peter Berger, who claimed similar ideas back in 
the 1970s, did witness the reversal of the global secularization trend, and subsequently 
changed his position (2). In contrast, English philosopher John Gray contends that "the 
religious instinct is irrepressible in humans ....and the result of repressing religious needs 
has been a rash of secular cults." (3) In that sense, Gray actually echoes Emile Durkheim 
who considered religion as a specific human phenomena that will live on forever in 
different molds and shapes. 
 The reason for religious revival in Russia seems obvious at first glance: Orthodox 
faith had simply filled the void left by the disappearance of Soviet identity. However, 
since Russia is not the only state experiencing return to its religious roots, there must be 
more to it than that.  Scholars like Peter Berger (1999) (4), Alexander Vatoropin (2001) 
(5), and Catherine Kinvall (2006) (6) mark the advent of times of post- or counter-
modernization. According to their theories, the dogma of the post secular world is 
society’s reaction to modernism, in which everything is doubted.  It is a reaction of 
religious people to a faith that is reduced to "private opinion." 
 The radicalism and absolutism of modernism has created conditions for post-
modern concepts and a post-modern paradigm. But that does not mean that post-
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modernism would completely replace modernism. Both paradigms have co-existed for 
quite some time already. In religiosity, post-modernism finds its expression in counter-
modernism, or what Vyacheslav Karpov calls "counter-secularization." (7). According to 
Karpov, religious resistance to modernization is caused by the following two 
interconnected elements. 
1. Modernization has brought about secularization around the world and has 
diminished the ancient role of religion in society. Under these circumstances, 
counter-secularization appears to be a natural reaction - a rejection of modernism 
by more traditional and economically less developed societies. 
2. The economical, political, environmental and moral consequences of 
modernization are ambivalent. This means that progress in one field is quite often 
a cause of a regress in another (7). 
 Globalization, on the one hand, is beneficial everyone, even for the developing 
world.  On the other hand, it increases the economics gap between low and high income 
countries. Humans in the developed world experience unheard of abundance.  However, 
mass culture has practically demolished art, and moral and spiritual degradation are 
consequences of Western consumerism. As a result, traditional religions like Orthodox 
Christianity and Islam view negative aspects of globalization as absolute. 
 According to Vladimir Leksin, all civilizations are to a different extent "entities 
formed around tradition." (8) Tradition is desired by most societies and humans because 
it creates economic, political, and, of course, cultural stability. Tradition is a defense of 
the core uniqueness of every civilization. Thanks to tradition only civilizations are able to 
keep their identity, values, and language. Leksin considers pursuit of tradition as "a 
civilizational self-defense." (9) A loss of tradition, according to him, would be a virtual 
surrender.  For instance, even though a people still populates the same territory under the 
same political regime, surrendering their traditions would mean they become part of a 
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different civilization and culture. That is why the bearers of each national identity 
instinctively treat that tradition with respect and intuitively do not easily assume new 
customs, unless the new culture coordinates with their own accepted one and does not 
threaten their identity. 
 Elites of every civilization are constantly guarding their civilizational values 
because they perceive that this is a defense of the state’s sovereignty and their power. 
States within a civilization consolidating for defense or spreading their values can easily 
be observed today in Western and Islamic civilizations. History has little or no examples 
of one civilization consciously and voluntarily surrendering to another.  
 In the Information Age, and the subsequent manipulation of human consciousness 
through mass media, mass culture, and social networks, civilizational self-defense or 
active support of such manipulations has become an interest of many people let alone 
state structures. For instance, the level of awareness of one’s own national identity is 
different from one person to another and depends on many factors: social, educational, 
gender, and so forth. A good portion of those people responsible for forming public 
opinion in Russia today, including public figures from politicians to artists, are convinced 
of Western civilizational expansion and invasion of a cultural space that just 25 years ago 
filtered whatever it deemed good or bad for its internal use. In the minds of the Russian 
people, and many of popular ideologists like Alexander Dugin, for instance, Western 
values implanted into Russian soil keep eroding Christian Orthodox civilization.  Most 
people still remember how quickly liberal values had replaced communist ideology and 
the devastating consequences of 'the shock therapy' of the 90's. The memory of the very 
unfortunate attempt to implant foreign ideas in such a short time span intensifies the 
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rejection of Western hypertrophy of individual freedom, same sex marriage, and the 
military establishing "democratic regimes" around the world.  Or, as Catherine Danks 
puts it, "the impact of shock therapy fanned the flames of anti-Westernism." (10) 
 Civilizational self-defense is not exclusive to the states under Western 
civilizational attack, it is a feature of every civilization. Both the U.S. and Europe 
actively protect their civilizational values and counter-attack external influences.  This 
can be seen with McCarthyism in the 1950s and the rise of ultra-right in France.  More 
recent examples include Brexit in the UK and Trump in the U.S., which both could 
arguably fall into that category of civilizational self-defense. Self-defense discourse is a 
staple of any right wing politician.  A French politician, for instance, stated that, "we now 
observe, on our national soil, a clash between two fundamentally different cultures. 
Islam.....is opposed to any assimilation and threatens our own identity, our Western 
Christian civilization" (11). 
 Vladimir Leksin notes that "white" Europeans are afraid to wake up in a 
completely Muslim France (Belgium or Germany) however they fail to realize that for 
that they would have to return to Christianity and increase Christian demography." (12) 
That is, apparently, a solution that the Russian authorities have committed themselves to 
to in order to preserve national identity. And while demographically Russia is dragging 
behind (13), ideology is always a plan that could be implemented at a tremendous speed, 
provided one's access to mass media is free of dissenting opinions. 
 A young Russian state is in dire need of its own identity, and very often the search 
for that identity takes extreme forms when one path is followed with a complete rejection 
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of the other.  It is as if the further one pushes the pendulum of Russian political thought 
to the right the further it will go to the left afterwards. 
 And so on Dec 2013, when Putin gave a speech before State Duma, the Kremlin 
officially declared a cultural war declaring, "We know that there are more and more 
people in the world backing us up in our struggle for traditional values, which for 
millennia had been the spiritual, moral basis of every civilization, every people: values of 
traditional family, values of true human existence including a religious one." (14) 
 Civilizational defense has two vectors.  One is directed outward and concerns 
foreign policies of the state.  The other one is inward and involves many things, such as 
educational and demographic policies. As Catarina Kinvall in her work on the rise of 
religious nationalism in India maintains, "Dominance and resistance are... two sides of 
the same coin. Globalization has assisted in bringing back notions of bounded cultures, 
ethnic resilience and the re-emergence of powerful nationalistic sentiments." (15) Self-
defense of a Russian civilization has found its expression in a rather unfortunate "de-
modernizing impulse.....that seeks a reversal of the modern trends that have left the 
individual alienated and beset with the threats of meaninglessness." (16) 
 The second half of the first decade of the 21st century has seen the transition of 
Russia's policies and ideologies to its great past, re-constructing seemingly incompatible 
symbols of both Romanov's Empire and the USSR. This has become Russia’s response to 
the Westernization and the major discourse of Russian officials of all levels. On the 
material level, Russia perceives the West as having no interest in an equal partner but 
instead a politically, economically and culturally weak provider of cheap natural 
resources and dumping ground for nuclear waste. Even the most liberally minded people 
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could not ignore unequal cultural exchange, "Russian ballet and opera companies spend 
much of their time touring abroad to earn money and in return the Russian people get 
Hollywood action films and pornography." (17) According to polls conducted in 2015 by 
the Levada Center, 48% of Russians think that the US is creating obstacles for Russia to 
become a strong state (39% in 2007), and 36% perceive the U.S. as wanting to impose its 
cultural influence on Russia (44% in 2007) (18).  
 The anti-Westernism of modern Russia’s narrative has no choice but to be rooted 
in religious discourse as the West in Russia is perceived as secularized, godless and even 
satanic. Here's what Patriarch of Moscow all Rus' Kirill has to say on that matter, “Things 
that modern civilization preaches today - is an absolutely godless idea. I would say - a 
satanic idea.... People do not understand that, looking through those glossy magazines 
with beautiful ads - it is dizzying. In reality, it is just a wrapping, what could be inside of 
that wrapping? The most horrendous things." (19) 
 The views of a Patriarch Kirill are met with understanding in Kremlin, especially 
his blatantly anti-liberal stance.  Here are just a few of his statements from the past years. 
"These days we are witnessing how the concept of human rights is used to cover up lies 
and insults our national and religious values." (20) "A state public sphere should only 
spread and support those values that have backing of majority of people." (21) The 
Patriarch also disagrees with defining the Russian Federation as a secular or multi-
confessional state, saying, "We have to drop that term 'multi-confessional' country for 
Russia is a Christian Orthodox territory with national and religious minorities in it." (22) 
In 1995, during the Second Russian's People Council, Kirill (then a Metropolitan of 
Smolensk and Kaliningrad) declared that "our soil was imbued with alien and ugly ideas. 
 32 
There has been a deformation of a national self-consciousness, it was replaced with a 
foreign cosmopolitan self-consciousness." (23) 
 If modernity's main feature is a constant change and adaptation to circumstances, 
then religion provides structure, stability, and a shelter from the chaos of the ever-
changing and globalizing world. The social function of religion is to preserve "truth" as it 
is a constant and does not conform to history, regimes or politics. This way religion quite 
often supports intolerance towards the bearers of other faiths who have different “truths”. 
Hence attacks on religion as a purveyor of stability, provider of truth, and base of 
national identity is considered as assault against the nation.  
 The current change in church-state relations in Russia becomes clearer when the 
current discourse between clergy and politicians is juxtaposed against the times when the 
first post-Soviet Russian Patriarch, Patriarch Alexii II, was the head of the ROC. Alexii 
openly rejected Orthodox Christianity as a national ideology.  He was against a literal 
interpretation of the formula "the Church serves Russia" and actively criticized clergy 
who tried "to marry Church and state." He repeatedly addressed that issue in his 
preaching, reminding people that "wherever church was tying a knot with any state 
regime or ideology, it was always left a 'political widow' when a new regime or ideology 
came along." (24)  
 We can currently observe the ROC's return to shaping Russia’s internal and 
external policies. For that purpose a Department of External Church Affairs (DECA) of 
the ROC was created. Apart from handling the Russian Orthodox Church's connections 
with local Russian churches, Orthodox churches abroad, Christian and non-Christian 
confessions, DECA interacts with NGOs and Russian governmental and State Duma 
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agencies. While being a head of DECA, the current Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus has 
developed his own globalizational project, which later has become a part of the "Bases".  
This project contains the main vectors of the ROC's policies, as Patriarch Kirill sees it.  
Russia's international affairs, while in close connection with the ROC, are being 
"transformed into seeing a full picture of national interests". For instance, due to the 
ROC's stand on the Vatican, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot permit a 
Papal visit.   
 Creating a special status for Orthodox Christianity was started back in 1997 when 
the State Duma passed the law "On Freedom of Conscience and Associations." (25) The 
law, in clear contradiction to equality of all religions declared in Constitution of 1993, 
divided religious institutions into traditional and nontraditional groups. The traditional 
organizations remained entitled for full legal privileges and tax exemptions. The 
nontraditional groups, which included Catholic, Baptist, and sectarian Russian Orthodox 
groups operating outside of the ROC, were denied full privileges and were required to 
undergo an annual and highly restrictive registration. Legal privileges included the ability 
to own property, distribute literature, run radio and television programs, and conduct 
services in alternative locations such as hospitals and prisons (26). Echoing that law three 
years later, "The Doctrine of Informational Security of the Russian Federation" declares 
"the opposition to the influence of foreign religious organizations and missionaries 
(Article 6, 2000)" - one of the main directions of informational security (27). 
 The fact that President Putin has meetings with his private confessor ('duhovnik') 
Archimandrite Tikhon (Shevkunov) has bothered many human rights activists in Russia 
not because he should not do it as a private individual but rather because Shevkunov 
 34 
belongs to a highly politicized movement in Christian Orthodoxy. The very old idea of 
Moscow being the heir to Rome and Constantinople – “the Third Rome" - was a main 
message in Shevkunov’s film "The Fall of an Empire: the Lesson of Byzantium" (2008). 
According to this theory, Russia is the inheritor of Byzantium’s fallen Orthodox 
greatness, since "Byzantium rotted from within and succumbed to ideological predation 
by an envious West." (28) The film's plot has been criticized by many Russian liberals 
and historians for distorting and over-simplifying facts. The plot portrays Byzantium’s 
fall as having occurred prior to the Ottoman Invasion.  Constantinople decided to reform 
under the advice of Western (Venetian) bankers, thereby replacing the culture of 
Byzantium with Western ultra-individualistic values.  The Eastern Empire had then 
become a part of Western ideology. The documentary was broadcast three times on 
public national TV, earning sky-high ratings. 
 While the amendments to religious freedoms law in 1997 have complicated the 
operation of any religious denominations in Russia, aside from the "traditional four", in 
the U.S. law provides equality for all confessions with no state privileges for any faith. 
The state does not finance or politically support any religious denomination and at the 
same time does not create obstacles to any confession, including so-called cults. The 
most prominent Protestant denominations in the U.S. were historically created on the 
basis of democratic principles since both environment and ideology dictated democratic 
forms for confessional organizations. Even the centralized and authoritarian Catholic 
Church had to form around democratic principles that were built in the bureaucratic axis 
of its structure. Democratic principles inherent in American religious life have yet 
another aspect: human rights and civil freedoms gradually become staples of any major 
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religious denomination in the U.S.  Religion becomes a keeper and judge of the 
democratic regime itself as opposed to preserving and defending state power and 
officials. Representatives of different confessions often openly criticize politicians for 
their policies not being moral or just, as interpreted not only in the Christian context but 
also in a purely democratic secular context. 
 The ideas of anti-Westernism are easily detected in the discourse of clergy and 
church officials. Here are just a few examples. Metropolitan Kurskii Juvenalii (Tarasov) 
criticizes Europeanization, which in his words has become "a disease of Russian life" and 
"threatens to dissolve Orthodox Christianity in an unseen before mix of heresies behind 
which is the Satan himself." (29) The worst of all heresies in his view is Catholicism. 
Archbishop of Novosibirsk Tikhon (Yemelyanov) is also convinced that "a hand of the 
West is behind Russia's erosion." (30) As for the Archbishop of Vladivostok Veniamin 
(Pushkar), the prime enemy is not just the West but rather the Jews of Western 
civilization "for they love the material more than heavenly....and for that from the chosen 
people of God has turned into an accursed one.  Russian people have to sever the knot 
that Zionists and masons have tied and for that Russia cannot exist without a Tsar." (31) 
The most extreme opinion was voiced by Metropolitan of Saint Petersburg Ioann, who 
simply refuses to admit the legitimacy of "human rights" and "universal human values." 
(32) 
 The latest example of "the Orthodox Christian is Russian" discourse has 
transpired just recently, during the opening ceremony of the monument to Prince 
Vladimir who baptized Rus' back in 988 AD. Addressing all Russian people and 
President Putin personally, Patriarch Kirill states that "a loss of spiritual identity spells 
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doom for any culture," adding that "if not for Vladimir's choice of Byzantine Christianity 
there would have been no Rus' no modern Russia at all." (33) The central message of the 
Patriarch's speech was that the right choice was made already 1000 years ago (apparently 
for Ukraine and Byelorussia as well), and the Russian people were granted their 
civilizational code and immutable identity. The task, therefore, is simple: to preserve that 
identity from cultural and other assaults from abroad.  
 Another indicator of the collaboration between the Russian Orthodox Church and 
the state involves the mass return of Russian Orthodox philosophers to the public and 
state discourse. Deemed "semi-fascist" by the liberal press (34), Ivan Ilyin has been 
repeatedly quoted by Putin and many other elite members, including film director Nikita 
Mikhalkov, who along with Gleb Pavlovski and Vladislav Surkov constitute an 
intellectual circle around the Russian President.  Putin's interest in conservative 
philosophers did not remain just his private fascination. Since becoming president he has 
quoted Nikolai Berdyaev in one of his speeches in 2013 after a special course in 
conservative philosophy held for the Kremlin officials. (35) 
 I will briefly summarize the main ideas of Ilyin to further explain Russia's search 
for identity in Christian Orthodoxy. Freedom in Ilyin's philosophy has two dimensions: 
"freedom from what?" and "freedom for what?" Freedom is needed for defense of 
spiritual values and protection of "Faith, Tsar and Fatherland". A Russian man feels and 
recognizes this “freedom” as a heart's desire to fulfill its duty like its own vital need and 
sacred mission. This is a freedom of a Russian conservative (a Slavophil as opposed to 
westerner or 'zapadnik' - the one who adheres to liberal ideas).  "The Russian people have 
more than just political rights, they have political duties - to save and to protect Russian 
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Tsar and Russian Church." (36)  Ilyin's vision is radical: the more Russia's way of 
thinking is denounced, the less your chances of understanding its culture and history are. 
For Russia is the bearer of the Divine Truth: the Orthodox Christianity. Accordingly, 
Ilyin is quite content with the West not accepting Russia's way because it reveals the 
West’s emptiness.  Thus, Russia rejects universal values, seen as the values of the West, 
and gravitates towards its traditional values and a spiritual society that is rooted in their 
religion: Orthodox Christianity. In his article "On Russian Idea," Ilyin states, " We are 
not to imitate spiritual culture from other peoples... every people create what they can 
accordingly to what is given to them and is not supposed to 'beg and pan-handle'... our 
task is to create Russian spiritual culture from the Russian heart, with Russian 
contemplation, in Russian freedom - that is the essence of the Russian idea." (37)  
 In his recent work, "In Putin's Head," philosopher and writer Michel Eltchaninoff 
has analyzed the main ideas behind Putin's favorite philosophers and has come to a 
conclusion that the Russian President is guided by the three principles of  Russian 
Orthodox thought:  
a) Conservatism. Europe is a decadent continent against which Russia has to 
battle by using Christian Orthodoxy's moral order (Ilyin); 
b) The Russian Way. This is a popular idea of Slavophils of the XIXth century 
The West seeks to make Russia a weak state, and so Russia must protect its 
cultural and political system.  This point is made by Nikolay Danilevski and his 
"Russia and Europe," a popular work in Putin's circles.  
c) The Eurasianism of Lev Gumilev. Russia, the "Empire of Earth," confronts the 
West, the "Atlantic Empire.” Russia "as a Eurasian country, is a unique example 
where the dialogue of cultural civilizations has become a centuries-old tradition of 
state and public life.” (from Putin's speech made during the Culture and Art 
Council, 25 November 2003, Moscow) (38).  
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 More modern philosophy has a considerable impact on Putin's policies as well. 
Alexander Dugin, another proponent of Eurasianism, is said to be Putin's adviser on 
ideology, which includes a standard conservative agenda.  He commented recently on last 
U.S. elections, "the main objective is to stop the spread of liberal globalism." (39).  
 As for the Russian people themselves, after 25 years it looks like they are having 
a hard time adapting to full scale consumerism, individualism and secularism, the three 
main features of modern Western culture. No doubt personal freedom is valued, 
especially by the ones who grew up in U.S.S.R., as is an access to a variety of goods 
unavailable for many years. At the same time, the Russian people do not rush into a full 
scale acceptance of individualism as a cultural ideal and consumerism as modus vivendi. 
The image of the Orthodox Church as a fortress of conservatism has become attractive 
for millions of people who, just like Church itself, could not adapt to the shock therapy of 
the 1990’s and were marginalized in yet another wave of modernization in Russia. The 
Russian government fully realizes that and its amalgamation with ROC is also a 
calculated step in order to receive ideological support and legitimization from people that 
it could not provide for economically.  
 With that narrative constantly present in the political discourse of state and ROC's 
officials, any pressure on Russia to fully adopt secular liberal values of the West would 
create more rejection and further tightening of the ROC and State union. One of the 
recent forms of such an opposition to globalizing forces has become a "Federal Law on 
Changes in Article 148 of the Criminal Code of RF in Order to Counteract Actions That 
Insult Religious Feelings of Citizens." (40) 
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 The criminalization of blasphemy in Russia was spurred by the infamous "Pussy 
Riot case."  On February 21, 2012, members of the punk protest group "Pussy Riot" 
staged a performance in Moscow's Cathedral of Christ the Savior. Their actions were 
qualified by court as "hooliganism motivated by religious hatred", and each member was 
sentenced to two years' imprisonment." Just over a year after the incident the Russian 
Parliament ('State Duma') adopted "On Insulting Religious Feelings of Believers" 
(Article 148 "Violation of rights on the freedom of consciousness and faith") to the 
Criminal Code, according to which such actions could lead to up to three years of 
imprisonment.  
 By adopting changes in legislation that criminalize insulting religious feelings 
Russia has gone in the opposite direction of the blasphemy de-criminalization trend in 
Europe.  The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 made blasphemous actions 
legal in England and Wales; the Netherlands, Norway, and Iceland have since followed 
that path, with Ireland campaigning for a referendum to repeal the blasphemy law.  
 While the general perception of blasphemy laws in the West is of something 
"ancient" (41) or "illiberal" (42), the State Duma and President Putin apparently hold a 
different opinion. When questioned on Pussy Riot’s imprisonment prior to their sentence, 
Putin explicitly stated that he considers their actions to be "blasphemous and a blow to 
society's moral values." (43)   
 Archpriest Alexander Shargunov, a head of the Committee "For Moral 
Renaissance of the Fatherhood," was even more specific.  He considered Pussy Riot's 
protest as a link in a chain of actions that "targeted Orthodox Christianity as a base of 
Russia's statehood." In his view "a reign of sexual minorities and 'wizards' is taking a 
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hold of the world and Russia ...and the 'protest' that happened in the Cathedral of Christ 
the Savior concerns not just ROC but all the Russian people." (44) Alexander 
Vishnyakov of the World Russian People's Council headed by Patriarch Kirill echoes 
these words in his disagreement for forgiveness of Pussy Riot's actions.  Krill states that 
"Destroying the Church's authority is a link in a long chain of events that leads to a total 
catastrophe of Russian civilization's value system." (45) 
 The president's, people's and priesthood's perception of the so called "punk-
prayer" performed by Pussy Riot in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior had found its 
reflection in State Duma that have initiated the debates on a new law almost 
instantaneously. The authors of blasphemy criminalization belong to the unofficial 
"Orthodox lobby" of the Russian parliament. This group is comprised of members of a 
few parties, including the dominant "United Russia", Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, 
"Just Russia" and the communists. Altogether the unofficial and unregistered group 
includes about 40 people (Duma totals 450 members), they, in the words of their 
'coordinator' Sergei Popov, aim for "supporting the policies of Patriarch Kirill, his 
legislative initiatives and an overall strengthening of ROC's positions." (46) 
 In September 2012, seven months before law's adoption, the Levada Center 
conducted a poll to clarify people's attitudes towards possible blasphemy criminalization.  
They found that 67% of poll participants supported the idea of introducing 
criminalization of blasphemy (47).  
 However popular that measure was at that time, its practical application is 
doubted by almost all expert lawyers since it is almost impossible to create definitions for 
terms like "feelings" for criminal legislation. Only one person has been indicted since the 
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law's adoption. From the moment of its adoption the law has been repeatedly criticized in 
the liberal mass media. It has even been publicly protested by some members of ROC 
themselves, who maintain that "true believers are under protection of God not Criminal 
code." (48) 
 In November 2016, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation initiated a 
review of this law as being in contradiction with the State Constitution. So far, however, 
the law is being actively used by ROC's representatives to protest any cultural event that 
they deem as "insulting to their religiosity".  This has included a performance of 
Wagner's "Tannhäuser" opera in Novosibirsk (49) and even an unfinished film on 
Nicholas II - the last Romanov who was canonized by ROC in 2000. (50) It is important 
to note that while the case of Pussy Riot was about intrusion on the "church's territory", 
the new law now permits the ROC to interfere into what was once completely secular 
matters. The law has also untied the hands of so called 'Orthodox Christian activists' who 
with authority's silent agreement have been protesting various artistic endeavors around 
the country.  
 In the meanwhile, during 2016, The World Russian People's Council has declared 
that expression of hatred towards members of the ROC or of desecration of sacred sites 
and objects is equaled to the acts of Rusophobia. Pussy Riot's performance is mentioned 
in the declaration as an instance of Rusophobia, alongside Islamic terrorism. (51) 
 It is too early to tell whether the joint determination of the power structures and 
the ROC to secure the national identity with re-affirming and protecting its Orthodox 
Christian part through criminalization of blasphemy has brought any results. The article 
148 of the State Criminal Code might survive the petitions to abolish it but it would 
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hardly be of any practical use aside from intimidating people into self-censoring. 
Attempting to 'securitize subjectivity' through blasphemy criminalization might just 
distance Russia further away from the west with no guarantee of actual protection of the 
national identity. 
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Chapter 4. Conclusion 
 
 On the whole, the increased and unrestricted influence of Western liberal ideas 
and culture in post-Soviet Russia has caused the unmooring of national identity from its 
ethnic and religious foundation. In Russia, the amalgamation of the ROC and the state, 
and the subsequent criminalization of blasphemy, has been caused by the complex 
combination of the following three factors: the pronounced anti-Western position of the 
ROC's clergy, the need to fill in the identity vacuum left by the dissolution of the 
U.S.S.R., and the determination of the Russian executive branch to assert its ability to 
restore Russia's international status lost in the 1990s. 
 Consequently, with the Kremlin actively supporting the ROC with its legislative, 
administrative and mass media resources, it could be confirmed that the Russian state is 
"becoming increasingly identified with the ROC as part of its search for identity and 
resistance to perceived Western pressures." (1) The very fact that the Pussy Riot political 
protest was staged in the Orthodox Cathedral could be interpreted as evidence of the 
amalgamation of the Church and state in Russia.  
 Although, according to the latest polls, citizens of Russia exhibit support for the 
ROC as a main provider of cultural identity and a link to their historical past (2), it could 
be said that merging the state and the Church in Russia is predominantly a top-down 
decision. The society itself treats the expansion of ROC with indifference, thus giving a 
carte blanche to authorities and making the merging of the state and the ROC almost an 
irreversible course.  
 The criminalization of blasphemy is actively used to censor the internet (3) and 
the mass media, as well as a leverage against various artistic (4,5) and liberal endeavors. 
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The law contradicts the constitution of the Russian Federation and is detrimental to the 
development of freedom of speech in Russia. Over 18,000 people have already signed a 
petition on Change.org for abolition of the blasphemy law. (6) The petition points out the 
fact that it is impossible to define what exactly constitutes "religious feelings of 
believers." As a result of this ambiguity, any citizen or organization could be accused of 
blasphemy. And although it does not always lead to indictment it creates a situation of 
practically unrestricted censorship. The vague wording of the criminal law is fertile soil 
for various abuses in courts and for feeding a state funded propaganda machine. Being 
aware of that, most organizations and citizens are conditioned to the constant self-
censoring and vigilance towards possible "religious insults".  
 It could be said that in the past 16 years Russia is experiencing "a definite turn 
towards an anti-liberal 'special way', i.e., a totalitarian imperial regime using nationalist-
clerical ideology." (7) Despite the collaboration between the state and the ROC, one must 
recall that historically religious pluralism has never been a part of official Russian 
policies. Indeed, the present situation is a vast improvement on both Tsarist and Soviet 
religious administration. It does not seem that full scale religious freedom and Western 
secular state are possible in Russia under the present conditions. However, it becomes 
increasingly apparent that there will be more pressure applied to Russia internationally 
the more resistant its internal religious policies become. As I have attempted to 
demonstrate, both the structure of national identity and Huntington's polarization thesis 
help illuminate de-secularization, be it a top-down or bottom-up resistance to the 
secularizing influences of the West. A dialogue among cultures is possible only when all 
participants make an effort to be on the same level with each other, yet the discourse of 
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Westernization excludes that possibility.  And so the Kremlin's policies would remain 
consistently anti-secular and anti-Western in general.  
 Along with that, the outright anti-democratic position of the ROC is one of the 
main elements that distances Russia from the West and holds back social and economic 
modernization. One might hope that a more democratic evolution of the ROC-state 
relationship in Russia is inevitable, and that the ROC is simply complying with the 
political demands of the current Russian government. And yet it is becoming clear that 
the ROC itself is lacking alternative views of people like Andrei Kurayev, Fathers 
Mitrofanov, and Innokenty Pavlov who have distanced themselves from the hard-line 
conservative position of the Moscow Patriarchate. Russia's future as a leading world 
power is very much dependant on whether it will be able to bring up a multi-national and 
multi-confessional identity.  
 How far will Russia go in its resistance to the West to secure its national identity? 
The question remains open. Strengthening its own identity may mean distancing itself 
from everyone else. The path of separating itself from the West might lead to 
isolationism that eventually was one of the major causes of the Soviet Union's demise. It 
is clear that other countries experience similar processes of westernization however its 
hard to tell whether they would follow Russia's current suit, considering anti-westernism 
is not a part of every country's history. 
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